

TO []

23 July 1951

[]
Spear 85.

✓ 1. I talked this proposal over in London and in Rome. The British now agree that suggestion 3 in Para. 2 is impracticable since the "gesture" would merely increase the influence of the BK and nullify the effect of the change.

✓ 2. The British are still inclined to feel that something could be gained by making Abas KUPI chairman or president of the NCFA, but [] states that the assumption of additional responsibilities would probably break KUPI's health and that it would not be in our interests to thrust this additional burden on him.

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G.

GMY/clg

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3028
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

[] }
The gist of the agreement
should be passed by cable to
[] and []
From cables [] [] []
Field Force "Up" in this
Phase of BCF-12MP

To: []

From: []

June 7th, 1951

1. My headquarters have been considering the situation created by Said's accusations against the BK in the United States, and Pali's threat to lead a counter-campaign to have Said removed from the NCFA. In order to avert a serious split in the NCFA, they intend immediately to instruct our representative [] to take soothing action with a view to calming tempers. I understand that you have already issued instructions to the same effect. In the meantime, my headquarters would like to suggest the following scheme for your consideration. Its object is to alter the structure of the NCFA in such a way as to provide a more durable basis for future developments.

2. They suggest, (1) that Dosti should be removed from the effective Chairmanship of the NCFA, and be given some such title as "Honorary Chairman" or "Honorary President"; (2) that Abas Kupa be installed as Executive Chairman; (3) that the vacancy on the NCFA should be filled by Abas Ermenje, this as a gesture to the BK.

3. My headquarters suggest that this procedure would have the following advantages:

(1) The strength of the BK on the NCFA would be weakened. On the other hand, the BK might find Abas Kupa a reasonably satisfactory chairman, as they were agreeably impressed by the impartiality and restraint which he showed during the recent dispute between the BK and the BKI.

(2) Said's capacity to make trouble would be diminished, as he would be confronted by an impartial chairman in any dispute with the BK. It is also believed that the scheme would weaken the BKI's position, since they would be unable to complain of Left-Wing tendencies in the NCFA.

(3) Our operations into Albania might go more smoothly in that our parties would be heartened by the fact that their leaders held strong posts on the NCFA as well as on the Military Junta.

(4) Italians would be pleased as they would see in Abas Kupa's appointment a swing to the Right.

/(5) The Greeks

(5) The Greeks would also welcome a weakening of the position of the BK.

(6) The effect inside Albania is of course difficult to assess, but the gain will probably outweigh the loss owing to Abas Kupa's good resistance record, and his freedom from any collaborationist, Italian, Yugoslav, Greek or other local taint.

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